US President Donald Trump has tasted one of the most intoxicating experiences available to a powerful leader: an easy victory.
The danger is that easy victories can create the illusion that every problem can be solved through overwhelming force.
That lesson appeared to emerge from Venezuela.
On January 3, 2026, while much of the world slept, US forces launched a dramatic military operation against targets inside Venezuela, captured President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and transported them to the United States.
By morning, Maduro was no longer running Venezuela. He was an American prisoner.
Trump subsequently announced that Washington would oversee Venezuela’s political transition and moved aggressively into the country’s oil sector. Arrangements were announced under which millions of barrels of Venezuelan oil would be sold, with the proceeds placed under American control.
Whatever one’s assessment of Maduro’s government, the events represented an extraordinary assertion of American power.
The United States had entered another sovereign country, removed its head of state, transported him to the United States, inserted itself into the country’s political transition and assumed an extraordinary role in managing its most valuable economic resource.
And, at least militarily, it worked.
There was no prolonged American occupation. No years-long insurgency. No Fallujah. No Kabul. No Saigon.
The operation was over almost before the world had fully grasped what had happened.
For Trump, however, Venezuela offered something potentially more powerful than oil.
It offered the image of victory.
And victory can become dangerous when it teaches a leader the wrong lesson.
Every easy victory whispers the same thing to the victor:
You can do it again.
Iran changed the calculation
Then came Iran.
The US campaign against Iran was initially presented as another demonstration of overwhelming American power.
Trump spoke of a conflict lasting roughly four to five weeks. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth repeatedly insisted that the campaign would not become another Iraq and would not develop into an endless war.
The message from Washington was clear: this would be quick, focused and decisive.
The United States eventually inflicted enormous damage on Iranian military capabilities. Iran’s senior leadership suffered major losses, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while military installations and naval and air capabilities were heavily targeted.
Washington celebrated what it described as a decisive military victory.
But Iran refused to behave like a defeated power.
That is where the difference between Venezuela and Iran became important.
Iran possesses something Venezuela did not: the Strait of Hormuz.
Suddenly, geography began to matter.
A narrow waterway became a strategic weapon capable of complicating the calculations of a superpower with aircraft carriers, advanced aircraft and precision missiles.
Iran did not necessarily need to defeat America militarily. It only needed to make victory sufficiently expensive.
Threatening shipping could disrupt energy markets. Higher insurance costs could hurt global commerce. Rising oil prices could eventually affect American consumers.
Washington could destroy Iranian infrastructure, but Iran could still impose costs on the United States and its allies.
The four-week conflict became five weeks.
Five became six.
Then months.
The supposedly decisive victory had not produced the clean political conclusion Washington appeared to expect.
That distinction is crucial.
Military superiority and strategic victory are not the same thing.
A country can possess the ability to destroy more of an opponent’s military infrastructure and still struggle to achieve its political objectives at an acceptable cost.
Iran has demonstrated that reality.
The Strait of Hormuz becomes a strategic weapon
The Strait of Hormuz has become a central part of the confrontation.
Washington and Tehran have offered conflicting accounts of whether the waterway is genuinely open and safe, while shipping traffic has fallen significantly below normal levels.
With military pressure alone failing to produce the desired political outcome, Washington has increasingly turned to economic pressure.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has unveiled an aggressive sanctions campaign aimed at squeezing Iran financially and punishing entities that continue to do business with Tehran.
The strategy is straightforward: doing business with Iran could mean risking access to the American financial system.
But there is another complication.
China.
Beijing is the dominant buyer of Iranian oil exports and has rejected Washington’s sanctions strategy where it conflicts with Chinese economic interests.
This creates another kind of Strait of Hormuz problem.
Sanctions work best when major economic powers cooperate. Their effectiveness becomes considerably more complicated when the world’s second-largest economy decides to protect its interests.
Washington therefore faces a difficult calculation.
Directly confronting Iran is costly.
Directly confronting China economically could be even more complicated.
And the United States is simultaneously dealing with broader trade tensions, including its relationship with Canada.
Canada refuses to bend
Perhaps Trump expected Canada to respond differently.
Venezuela had been overwhelmed militarily. Iran had been subjected to devastating attacks. Why should Canada not yield to American economic pressure?
But Canada is not Venezuela.
And Prime Minister Mark Carney has shown little willingness to compromise Canadian sovereignty simply to avoid confrontation with Washington.
When Washington reportedly sought restrictions affecting Canada’s ability to negotiate its own trade relationships, Carney rejected the demand.
Trump responded with tariffs.
Canada responded with retaliation.
The lesson is not that Canada can economically overpower the United States. It cannot.
The lesson is that national strength is not simply a question of size.
Sovereignty sometimes means being willing to absorb economic pain rather than surrender strategic independence.
A smaller country may not be able to defeat a larger power, but it can still increase the cost of coercion.
That changes the calculation.
Trump’s political clock is ticking
The political calendar makes the situation even more significant.
The US midterm elections are scheduled for November 3, 2026.
Every seat in the House of Representatives will be contested, while control of Congress will be at stake.
Trump therefore enters the election season carrying an unresolved Iran conflict, elevated energy costs and a series of foreign-policy challenges.
He also continues to face political pressure over the Jeffrey Epstein controversy.
There is no evidence that the Iran war was launched to distract attention from the Epstein files, despite claims made by some of Trump’s critics.
But one fact is undeniable: the Iran conflict has not made the controversy disappear.
The scandal has survived the missiles.
That leaves Trump with a potentially uncomfortable political problem.
He has built much of his political identity around strength, winning and the ability to force opponents to submit.
A prolonged conflict that produces military destruction without a clear political settlement is therefore difficult to sell as an uncomplicated victory.
Trump may want another success.
A photograph.
A surrender.
A dramatic headline.
A foreign government yielding to American pressure.
In other words, another Venezuela.
The question is: where could that victory come from?
Nigeria should be paying attention
This is where Nigeria enters the discussion.
There is no evidence that Washington has selected Nigeria for military intervention.
Nor is there evidence that Trump has decided to launch an operation against the Nigerian government.
But responsible governments should not wait until aircraft are in the air before considering geopolitical risks.
Nigeria already has an important precedent to consider.
On Christmas Day 2025, American forces struck Islamic State targets in northwestern Nigeria.
The operation was conducted in cooperation with the Nigerian government. That distinction is important.
However, Trump had previously threatened unilateral American action if Nigeria failed to adequately protect Christians from extremist violence.
Reuters subsequently reported that Nigerian cooperation in the Christmas operation may have helped Abuja avoid a unilateral American military intervention.
That should command Nigeria’s attention.
American weapons have already been used on Nigerian territory during Trump’s presidency.
Washington has already publicly questioned Nigeria’s ability or willingness to protect vulnerable communities.
Trump has already demonstrated elsewhere that American military power can be used against another country’s territory when his administration determines that American interests or security concerns justify action.
The question for Abuja is therefore straightforward:
What has fundamentally changed since Christmas?
Has terrorism disappeared?
Have attacks against vulnerable communities ended?
Has Nigeria achieved unquestionable control over its territory?
If not, what prevents another escalation?
Nigeria’s political vulnerability
There is another complication.
President Bola Tinubu enters a sensitive political period while a US federal court battle continues over historical FBI and DEA records concerning him.
A Freedom of Information Act lawsuit has sought access to records connected to historical investigations involving Tinubu.
The Nigerian president has denied wrongdoing.
The historical proceedings frequently discussed in relation to the controversy resulted in civil forfeiture rather than a criminal conviction, and those distinctions are important.
Nevertheless, the continuing litigation means that politically sensitive American law-enforcement records concerning Nigeria’s president remain an issue in Washington.
That matters because Nigeria’s presidential election is scheduled for February 20, 2027.
Trump’s midterm election comes first, on November 3, 2026.
Two leaders.
Two elections.
Two sets of political pressures.
And an increasingly complicated relationship between American domestic politics and foreign policy.
Nigeria would be unwise to ignore the overlap.
What would a Trump “victory” in Nigeria look like?
It does not necessarily mean American helicopters landing at Aso Rock.
Geopolitical coercion comes in many forms.
A possible escalation could involve another unilateral counterterrorism strike, an expanded American campaign against extremist organisations, sanctions against Nigerian officials, visa restrictions, financial pressure, intelligence disclosures or diplomatic isolation.
Washington could also pressure Abuja into accepting security arrangements that could then be presented as evidence of American influence.
Again, none of these outcomes should be treated as a prediction.
The important question is whether Nigeria has conducted serious contingency planning.
Has Abuja developed scenarios for a sudden deterioration in relations with Washington?
Has it built a diplomatic strategy involving Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department, American religious organisations, the African Union, ECOWAS and European partners?
Has Nigeria strengthened relationships with countries capable of increasing the diplomatic cost of unilateral American action?
Does Abuja have a communications strategy capable of explaining Nigeria’s security challenges directly to the American public before political actors in Washington define the narrative?
Most importantly, has Nigeria addressed the security weaknesses that created the vulnerability in the first place?
Sovereignty must be backed by competence
Nigeria cannot outgun the United States.
That is obvious.
But sovereignty is not protected solely by military strength.
It is also protected by competent government, institutional credibility, economic resilience, strategic alliances, effective diplomacy and the ability to provide security to citizens.
Canada offers one lesson.
Iran offers another.
Venezuela offers a third.
Venezuela demonstrated how quickly a weak state can be overwhelmed.
Iran demonstrated that military superiority does not automatically produce a cheap or uncomplicated victory.
Canada has demonstrated that even a smaller country can refuse to surrender its strategic interests when it is prepared to absorb the cost of confrontation.
Nigeria must decide which lesson it wants Washington to learn.
The answer should be clear.
Nigeria should not give Donald Trump another easy victory.
That does not mean provoking Washington. It does not mean adopting an unnecessarily confrontational foreign policy. And it certainly does not mean pretending that Nigeria can match American military power.
It means removing the vulnerabilities that make coercion easier.
Secure the people.
Control the territory.
Take terrorism seriously.
Protect Christians.
Protect Muslims.
Protect everyone.
Build credible intelligence institutions.
Strengthen regional alliances.
Diversify strategic partnerships.
Engage Washington continuously and intelligently.
And ensure that Nigeria’s internal weaknesses cannot easily be converted into an external justification for intervention.
A country’s sovereignty cannot survive indefinitely as a press release.
If a government cannot protect its citizens, secure its territory or maintain institutional credibility, foreign powers will eventually find arguments for becoming involved.
Nigeria’s strongest defence against becoming somebody else’s geopolitical trophy is therefore not bravado.
It is competence.
Donald Trump may have learned from Venezuela that power can move with extraordinary speed when the target is weak.
Iran has shown him that some opponents can make victory painfully expensive.
Canada is showing him that even America’s closest neighbours can refuse to simply kneel.
Nigeria now has an opportunity to ensure that Washington learns a different lesson about Africa’s most populous country.
The political clock is ticking.
Trump needs a victory.
Iran has not provided one.
China has complicated the economic strategy.
Canada has refused to surrender.
The question is therefore moving across the geopolitical map:
Who will give Donald Trump the desperately needed victory?
Nigeria must make certain that the answer is not Nigeria.
